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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
000O000 
BARBARA J. MOTES, : 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : Case No. 88-0015-CA 
v. : 
Priority No. 14b 




APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
AND 
RESPONSE TO CROSS APPEAL 
Pursuant to Rule 24(c) of the Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals, Plaintiff/Appellant, Barbara J. Motes, submits the 
following Reply Brief in response to the Brief of Respondent/ 
Cross Appellant, Preston J. Motes. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a divorce case. As was stated in Appellant's 
initial Statement of the Case, it involves errors made by the 
trial court in the postponed division of Respondent's military 
pension benefits and the allocation of income tax exemptions 
between the parties. Respondent, in his cross appeal, claims 
error in the manner the trial court dealt with Appellant's 
inheritance and related appreciation. 
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STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS 
Appellant relies on the Statement of Facts set forth in her 
principal Brief on pages 3 through 8, and the following 
additional facts which are pertinent to Respondent's cross appeal 
related to Mrs. Motesfs inheritance and the manner in which the 
trial court dealt with it. Also, a correction should be made in 
the original Statement of Facts in that the parties were married 
for 2 0 years, not 17-1/2 years, as was initially stated. (See 
pages 1, 2 and 11 of Appellantfs Brief.) 
Mrs. Motes fs father died in February of 1985 (Tr. 37) and 
left a will naming her as his only heir (Tr. 45) . His estate 
consisted of approximately $140,000.00 in cash (Tr. 38, 65). She 
received $30,000.00 in February of 1985 (Tr. 65), and from that 
sum, the parties deposited $5,000.00 for each of the four 
children into four separate accounts, one for each child. The 
remaining $10,000.00 was applied towards family bills (Tr. 42). 
In December of 1985, an additional $100,000.00 was received (Tr. 
38), and from that each child was given another $15,000.00 
($60,000.00) (Tr. 69). The remaining amount was placed in a 
separate account for Mrs. Motes. (Mr. Motes said it was 
$20,000.00 [Tr. 69]; however, Mrs. Motes said it was $40,000.00 
[Tr. 38].) In December, 1986, Mrs. Motes received an additional 
$7,500.00 which was used to purchase a car for the parties1 son 
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(Tr. 39), and a final $3,000.00 was received in April or May of 
1987 (Tr. 40). 
Mr. Motes presented evidence relative to $32,384.00 in 
appreciation he claimed had occurred on the total inheritance 
which he said he invested for the children and Mrs. Motes (Tr. 
69). He did not distinguish the appreciation attributable to 
the $80,000.00 in the children's accounts from the appreciation 
attributable to the remaining inheritance which Mrs. Motes 
retained in her account. Mr. Motes then asked that that total 
appreciation be considered as marital property in his overall 
proposed property distribution (Defendant's Exhibit 1), but he 
asked that Mrs. Motes be awarded that appreciation, with him to 
receive marital assets to offset the award of appreciation to 
Mrs. Motes. 
Following trial, Mr. Motes's counsel prepared proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and presented them to 
Judge Rigtrup. They were signed after the Court had made certain 
handwritten deletions and interlineations. The following 
paragraphs are exact reproductions of the Findings and 
Conclusions entered by the Court in relation to the inherited 
property issue. 
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14. The defendant invested a portion of the money 
inherited by the plaintiff and W=» investments have produced 
tiings'^ $32,384. 00. 
19. The plaintiff should be awarded all of the 
accounts of the children established with funds from the 
plaintiff's inheritance and the right and obligation to manage 
those accounts, and the defendant should be ordered to take 
appropriate steps to turn those over to the plaintiff. 
26. The7$32,384.00 earned Viy U*M"difondant thgaugh hi<r 
TOTHUjUHHjuL oil the property inherited by the plaintiff should be 
considered a non-asset of the marriage. 
36. The court declares that it believes that it has 
divided the property of the parties with/$87,707.00 being awarded 
to the plaintiff and/$99,913.00 being awarded to the defendant 
and the extra amount has been awarded to the defendant for finan-
cial services provided to the plaintiff and the marital estate. 
37. The court has determined that it should award to 
the plaintiff the funds that she has inherited without counting 
that as part of the marital estate, although the defendant has 
requested that this be included for consideration purposes and 
that part of it, that is, the money that has been earned from the 
inherittnc^^rough the management of the defendant be considered 
as a marital asset. 
In summary, Judge Rigt rup found t h a t Mrs. Motesfs 
inher i tance had appreciated in value $32,384.00, but t ha t tha t 
appreciat ion was not a mari tal asse t , t ha t Mrs. Motes should 
receive her inher i tance , and the children should receive t h e i r 
accounts which were created from tha t inher i tance , and t ha t Mr. 
Motes should receive $12,206.00 more in mari ta l property to 
compensate him for any of h is e f for t s a t t r i b u t a b l e to increasing 
the value of the inher i tance . 
4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
The cases relied upon by Mr. Motes in responding to Mrs. 
Motesfs claim that Judge Rigtrup incorrectly deferred a division 
of monthly military retirement benefits either support Mrs. 
Motes's position or are clearly distinguishable from the facts 
of this case. Under Utah law, a trial court is required to 
consider retirement benefits as an asset of the marriage, and 
then make a fair and equitable distribution of that asset so that 
generally an equal division of the marital property is achieved. 
This did not occur in this case, and, consequently, Mr. Motes, 
over the five-year deferral period, will receive $89,040.00 more 
in marital property than Mrs. Motes. ($1,484.00/month x 12 
months x 5 years) That inequitable distribution constitutes a 
major abuse of discretion and justifies a reversal on that issue. 
POINT II 
TAX EXEMPTIONS 
The recent decision of the Utah Court of Appeals in Martinez 
v. Martinez, 754 P. 2d 69 (Ut. CA. 1988), requires trial courts 
in Utah to award income tax exemptions attributable to minor 
children to the custodial parent in a divorce action unless one 
of the following exceptions exists. 
1) The custodial parent voluntarily waives 
his or her right to claim the exemption; 
2) There exists a multiple support agreement; or 
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3) The exemption had been relinquished by the 
custodial parent under a qualified pre-1985 
instrument. 
None of the above exceptions exist in this case; therefore, the 
trial court erred in not awarding Mrs. Motes all of the minor 
children as tax exemptions. 
POINT III 
INHERITED PROPERTY 
Mr. Motesfs cross appeal on the issue of division of 
appreciation related to Mrs. Motes's inheritance is without merit 
for three separate reasons. First the trial court did consider 
the appreciation in the overall property distribution by awarding 
Mr. Motes $12,206.00 more in marital assets than Mrs. Motes was 
awarded, and specifically stating why it was doing so. Second, 
Mr. Motes claims that the appreciation attributable to the entire 
inheritance should have been part of the marital estate, even 
though $80,000.00 of the inheritance had previously been given to 
the parties1 children by Mrs. Motes. Mr. Motes presented no 
evidence to show what portion of the claimed appreciation was 
attributable to Mrs. Motes's remaining share of the inheritance. 
And, third, the manner in which the trial court dealt with the 
appreciation issue in relation to the marital property, inherited 
property, alimony and child support issues was consistent and 
entirely in accord with the Utah Supreme Court's recent decision 
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in Mortensen v. Mortensen, 89 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 (Utah Sup. Ct., 
filed August 16, 1988). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS 
DISCRETION IN DEFERRING DIVISION OF 
THE HUS BAND• S MONTHLY MILITARY 
RETIREMENT BENEFITS FOR A PERIOD OF 
FIVE YEARS-
In order to prevail on this appeal, Appellant is required to 
show that the trial court, in making its distribution of 
property, misunderstood or misapplied the law, entered findings 
not supported by the evidence, or caused serious inequity so as 
to constitute an abuse of discretion. English v. English. 565 
P.2d 409-410 (Utah 1977). Appellant recognizes that burden and 
states that it has been met. 
In this case, Judge Rigtrup misunderstood and misapplied the 
law as it relates to issues of marital property and support and 
caused a serious inequity to Mrs. Motes by not awarding her the 
right to immediately receive the benefits from the major marital 
asset acquired by the parties during this twenty-year marriage— 
Major Motesfs military retirement. This serious and material 
error constitutes an abuse of the trial court's discretion and 
its decision related to the parties1 pension plan should be 
reversed. 
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Mr. Motes, in Point I of his brief, cites a number of Utah 
cases which stand for the proposition that a trial court can 
distribute a pension plan in any number of ways. Mrs. Motes 
agrees. However, common to each of those cases are the 
principles that any such distribution must be fair and equitable 
to both parties, and that an interest in a retirement plan 
acquired during a marriage, being marital property, must be 
distributed in a way so as to achieve general parity between the 
parties in the overall property distribution. In this case, 
Judge Rigtrup did not adhere to either of those principles and, 
by so doing, gave to Mr. Motes an additional $89,040.00 
($1,484.00/month x 12 months x 5 years) in marital property. 
Parenthetically, that sum does not include any cost of living or 
benefit increase that may occur during the five-year period. 
In claiming that the five-year delayed division of the 
monthly military retirement benefits was correct, Mr. Motes 
relies primarily on the cases of Dogu v. Doau, 652 P. 2d 1308 
(Utah, 1982), and Andersen v. Andersen, 85 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, to 
show the consistency of the trial court's decision with the 
decisions in these cases. These cases, however, are clearly 
distinguishable from the facts of the present case. 
In the Docru case, the parties divorced after a twenty-four-
year marriage. The husband was fifty-six years old at the time 
of divorce and had a successful ongoing anesthesiology practice. 
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One of the disputed issues in Dogu focused on the division of the 
doctor's not yet received retirement account and the impact of 
that on the future support expectations of Mrs. Dogu. 
In Dogu, the doctor husband had not retired at the time of 
the divorce and was not yet entitled to receive his monthly 
retirement benefits. His benefits, however, did have a fixed 
value at the time of trial. The trial court did not include the 
husband's retirement fund in the overall property distribution. 
Dr. Dogu agreed, claiming these funds should not be subject to 
division, even though they were acquired during the marriage. 
The Supreme Court disagreed and reversed and remanded on the 
retirement plan issue. 
In so doing, the Supreme Court outlined a number of 
acceptable division alternatives available to the trial court, 
each of which focused on making certain that Mrs. Dogu received 
one-half of the retirement fund or an appropriate equivalent. 
Most importantly, however, all of the suggested approaches were 
intended to grant a wife half of the retirement fund when that 
fund became available to her husband. 
In the Motes case, Mr. Motes contends that allowing him to 
keep the pension for five years before sharing it with the 
Plaintiff is consistent with Dogu. Mr. Motes fails to mention 
that none of the situations outlined by the Court in Dogu allow 
the husband to keep, and freely use this joint money for a period 
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of time prior to sharing whatever is left with his spouse. 
Dogu's suggested methods of division all involve directly 
sharing the benefits with the wife at the time the retirement 
fund is received by the husband, either by actually dividing the 
benefits or providing a substitute fund from which the wife would 
receive her share of the marital asset. Therefore, Dogu supports 
the position of Mrs. Motes in relation to the retirement issue. 
Mr. Motes also relies on the case of Andersen v. Andersen, 
85 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (Utah Ct. App. June 22, 1988), and argues 
that it is a case having facts analogous to the present case and 
standing for the proposition that a deferred distribution of an 
equity interest in a marital residence is acceptable. 
Unfortunately, the facts of Andersen don't fit the facts of this 
case. In Andersen, the trial court ordered the marital residence 
to be sold two years from the decree, but allowed Mrs. Andersen 
to use it during those two years. When the house was sold, the 
proceeds were then to be divided equally between the parties. In 
so doing, Mrs. Andersen paid for her use of the asset by 
maintaining monthly expenses related to it, thereby protecting 
the asset for both parties. When the home was sold, each party 
was to share equally in any appreciation related to the asset 
during the two-year period — admittedly, a fair way to handle 
that particular issue. 
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In this case, however, Mr. Motes gets to use the asset, 
contributes nothing to its maintenance, receives all its earnings 
for five years, while Mrs. Motes gets nothing but the child 
support she would have received even if the asset didn't exist. 
Mr. Motes meets his support obligation with a marital asset 
without "lifting a finger," or inconveniencing himself in any way 
whatsoever: all to the detriment of Mrs. Motes. That is unfair. 
It is inequitable. It is why Judge Rigtrup was wrong. 
Dogu and Andersen do not support the Defendant's assertion 
that it was proper for the trial court to delay the division of 
Mr. Motes's pension, allow him to receive the monthly payments 
and then to pay his child support from those payments. 
The trial court's decision on the military retirement 
payments should be reversed with any such reversal to include an 
order directing that Mrs. Motes receive her share of the monthly 
retirement payments that have been received since July 30, 1987-
- the date this matter was tried. 
POINT II 
POINT II OF RESPONDENT'S BRIEF DOES 
NOT CORRECTLY SET FORTH THE LAW IN 
UTAH RELATED TO WHO IS ENTITLED TO 
THE DEPENDENCY EXEMPTIONS IN A 
DIVORCE PROCEEDING. 
Mr. Motes, in Point II of his brief, argues that this 
Court's decision in Martinez v. Martinez, 754 P. 2d 69 (Ut. C.A. 
1988) , dealt only with the issue of whether or not there was a 
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"qualified pre-1985 instrument11 so as to allow Dr. Martinez to 
claim two of the children as exemptions for federal income tax 
purposes. He goes on to suggest that the issue as to whether or 
not a trial court can allocate income tax exemptions to a non-
custodial parent, vis-a-vis the federal statute which 
automatically grants the exemption to the custodial parent is 
still an "open question" in Utah. His suggestion is wrong. He 
has misconstrued and erroneously interpreted the holding in 
Martinez. 
Like the trial court in the present case, the trial court in 
Martinez, supra, awarded Dr. Martinez, the non-custodial parent, 
two of the parties1 three children as exemptions and ordered Mrs. 
Martinez to sign the required waivers. (In this case, Mr. Motes 
received one of the children as an exemption and the trial court 
ordered Mrs. Motes to sign the required waiver.) 
Mrs. Martinez appealed that award, and claimed that she was 
entitled under federal law to claim all of the children as 
exemptions because she was the custodial parent and that the 
supremacy clause of the United States Constitution, in light of 
the 1984 Tax Report Act and its effect on 26 USC Section 152 
(Supp. 1988), prevents a state court from allocating tax 
exemptions between the parties to a divorce action. 
This Court agreed with Mrs. Martinez and reversed the trial 
court on that issue, and as a matter of right, awarded her all 
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three exemptions. Dr. Martinez then petitioned the Utah Supreme 
Court for a Writ of Certiorari on the exemption issue in Martinez 
v. Martinez (Utah Supreme Court Case No. 880189, petition filed 
May 17, 1988). 
In his petition, Dr. Martinez argued that 26 U.S.C. Section 
152 does not limit the broad authority of a trial court in 
divorce actions to allocate tax exemptions, but only requires 
that a custodial parent sign a written declaration stating he or 
she will not claim the child as a dependent. He went on to argue 
that federal law further does not prohibit a state court from 
determining an equitable distribution of the tax exemptions and 
ordering a custodial spouse to execute the required form if it 
chose to award an exemption to the non-custodial parent. 
This is the same argument now being made by Mr. Motes. The 
Utah Supreme Court denied Dr. Martinez's Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari on the exemption issue on October 4, 1988. 
Mr. Motes has attempted to argue that in spite of the 
holding in Martinez, supra, the law in Utah is still unsettled in 
regard to the Court's power to allocate income tax exemptions in 
divorce actions. To the contrary, Martinez very clearly sets 
forth the law on exemptions in Utah when Judge Davidson wrote: 
. . . Plaintiff requested the tax exemptions 
for all three children but the trial court's 
order did not honor that request. This 
result is contrary to the general provisions 
of section 152(e). Any argument that the 
stipulation and separation agreement 
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qualifies as a pre-1985 instrument where 
plaintiff willingly relinquishes her right to 
the exemptions under federal law, neglects 
plaintiff's rejection of its terms in the 
post-divorce period. By amending her 
complaint, plaintiff modified and 
affirmatively rejected the pre-divorce 
distribution. Plaintiff is entitled to the 
tax exemptions for all of the children in 
view of the award of custody to her and the 
failure of defendant to establish any 
exception to the general rule stated above. 
Id. at 754 P.2d 69, 72. (Emphasis added.) 
In Martinez, the decree required Mrs. Martinez to execute 
the necessary waiver to allow her husband to claim two of the 
three children. That mandate of the trial court was considered 
by the Court of Appeals and specifically rejected by concluding 
that none of the three exceptions to section 152(e) existed and 
therefore the trial court erred in awarding Dr. Martinez any of 
the exemptions whatsoever. 
In spite of the very clear language in Martinez, Mr. Motes 
argues that two lines of reasoning have emerged from the states 
who have been presented with the issue and that Utah has not 
adopted either. The first concludes that the federal statute is 
controlling and state courts cannot order a custodial parent to 
execute a waiver, while the second line concludes state courts 
can make such an order. (See page 15 of Respondent's Brief.) 
Mr. Motes1s attempt to argue that the second approach is the 
better approach is without merit in that this Court has already 
elected to follow the first approach and award the exemptions to 
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the custodial parent and thereby give priority to the federal 
statute and the supremacy clause of the United States 
Constitution. That is the clear conclusion of Martinez, and 
consequently the law in Utah. 
Point II of Respondent's Brief is without merit. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN AWARDING PLAINTIFF 
HER INHERITANCE AND ITS 
APPRECIATION AS HER SOLE AND 
SEPARATE PROPERTY. 
In the cross appeal filed by Mr. Motes, he argues that "the 
trial court erred in refusing to consider the appreciation in the 
Plaintiff's inheritance as an asset which should be considered in 
dividing the property between the parties" (Respondent's Brief, 
p. 21) . That argument is flawed in three separate ways, each 
being fatal in and of itself. 
First, the trial court did consider the appreciation related 
to any inheritance received by Mrs. Motes by awarding Mr. Motes 
more marital property than Mrs. Motes in the overall property 
distribution. 
Second, Mr. Motes claim an interest in the appreciation 
attributable to the entire inheritance, even though $80,000.00 of 
it had earlier been given to the parties' children and therefore, 
was not part of the marital estate. 
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Third, Mr. Motes presented no evidence as to what portion of 
the appreciation was attributable to that part of the inheritance 
which Mrs, Motes retained and in spite of that, the trial court 
gratuitously gave him credit for his claim investment expertise 
and efforts. 
The most current statement of the law in Utah as to how 
gifted and inherited property is to be handled in divorce actions 
is found in the case of Mortensen v. Mortensen, 89 Utah Adv. Rep. 
7 (Utah Sup. Ct., filed August 16, 1988). Respondent has 
incorrectly cited this case as support for the argument he 
attempts to make in Point III of his brief. (See Respondent's 
Citation of Supplemental Authority, dated September 29, 1988.) 
In fact, Mortensen supports Mrs. Motes!s claim that the 
trial court considered the inheritance and related appreciation 
and the efforts Mr. Motes claimed he expended in connection with 
that appreciation in relation to its overall property and debt 
distribution and its award of alimony and child support. 
In writing for the majority in Mortensen, Justice Howe set 
forth what the law in Utah is on gifted and inherited property. 
We conclude that in Utah, trial courts 
making "equitable" property division pursuant 
to section 3 0-3-4 should, in accordance with 
the rule prevailing in most other 
jurisdictions and with the division made in 
many of our own cases, generally award 
property acquired by one spouse by gift and 
inheritance during the marriage (or property 
acquired in exchange thereof) to that spouse, 
together with any appreciation or enhancement 
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of its value, unless (1) the other spouse has 
by his or her efforts or expense contributed 
to the enhancement, maintenance, or 
protection of that property, thereby 
acquiring an equitable interest in it, Dubois 
v, Dubois, supra, or (2) the property has 
been consumed or its identity lost through 
commingling or exchanges or where the 
acquiring spouse has made a gift of an 
interest therein to the other spouse. Cf. 
Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326 (Utah 
1980) . An exception to this rule would be 
where part or all of the gift or inheritance 
is awarded to the nondonee or nonheir spouse 
in lieu of alimony as was done in Weaver v. 
Weaver, supra. The remaining property should 
be divided equitably between the parties as 
in other divorce cases, but not necessarily 
with strict mathematical equality. Teece v. 
Teece, 715 P.2d 106 (Utah 1986). However, in 
making that division, the donee or heir 
spouse should not lose the benefit of his or 
her gift or inheritance by the trial court's 
automatically or arbitrarily awarding the 
other spouse an equal amount of the remaining 
property which was acquired by their joint 
efforts to offset the gifts or inheritance. 
Any significant disparity in the division of 
the remaining property should be based on an 
equitable rationale, other than on the sole 
fact that one spouse is awarded his or her 
gifts or inheritance. The fact that one 
spouse has inherited or donated property, 
particularly if it is income-producing, may 
properly be considered as eliminating or 
reducing the need for alimony by that spouse 
or as a source of income for the payment of 
child support or alimony (where awarded) by 
that spouse. Such property might also be 
utilized to provide housing for minor 
children or utilized in other extraordinary 
situations where equity so demands. These 
rules will preserve and give effect to the 
right that married persons have always had in 
this state to separately own and enjoy 
property. It also accords with the normal 
intent of donors or deceased persons that 
their gifts and inheritances should be kept 
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within their family and succession should not 
be diverted because of divorce. 
Id at 9 and 10. 
In addition, after reading the transcript of the trial 
court1 ruling from the bench (Tr. 23-35, Vol. II), the Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Decree of Divorce (R. 190-
216), and Point III of Respondent's Brief (p. 19), it becomes 
very apparent that Mr. Motes has absolutely no basis to claim 
that the trial court did not consider the appreciation which was 
related to the inheritance Mrs. Motes received in 1985. To the 
contrary, it did consider that claim, as is shown by the 
following excerpts from the Findings and Conclusions. 
8. In February, 1985, the plaintiff's 
father died. When the parties went to the 
home that he had occupied, they found and 
removed from the home $30,000.00 in cash. 
The plaintiff's father made plaintiff his 
sole heir and she has inherited the said 
$3 0,000.00 in cash at the time of her 
father's death, $100,000.00 in December, 
1985; $7,500.00 in November, 1986; and 
$3,000.00 in December, 1986, for a total of 
$140,500.00. The estate has not been finally 
distributed, but most of it has been 
disbursed. (R. 192, Findings.) 
9. After the parties removed the 
$3 0,000.00 from the plaintiff's father's 
home, $20,000.00 was given to the defendant 
by the plaintiff to invest for their children 
and accounts were opened up in the sum of 
$5,000.00 for each of the four children of 
the parties. After the $100,000.00 payment 
had been received, an additional $10,000.00 
was set aside for each of the children of the 
parties. There are, now, $15,000.00 plus 
earnings in the accounts of each of the 
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children of the parties for a total of 
$60,000,00 plus earnings. (R. 192, 
Findings.) 
14. The defendant invested a portion of 
the money inherited by the plaintiff and 
those investments have produced earnings 
approximating $32,384.00. (R. 200, 
Conclusions.) 
19. The plaintiff should be awarded all 
of the accounts of the children established 
with funds from the plaintiff's inheritance 
and the right and obligation to manage those 
accounts, and the defendant should be ordered 
to take appropriate steps to turn those over 
to the plaintiff. (R. 200, Conclusions.) 
26. The approximate amount of 
$32,384.00 earned on the property inherited 
by the plaintiff should be considered a non-
asset of the marriage. (R. 201, 
Conclusions.) 
36. The court declares that it 
believes that it has divided the property of 
the parties with approximately $87,707.00 
being awarded to the plaintiff and 
approximately $99,913.00 being awarded to the 
defendant, exclusive of household furniture 
and goods and personal property not otherwise 
included, and the extra amount has been 
awarded to the defendant for financial 
services provided to the plaintiff and the 
marital estate. (R. 203-4, Conclusions.) 
37. The court has determined that it 
should award to the plaintiff the funds that 
she has inherited without counting that as 
part of the marital estate, although the 
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defendant has requested that this be included 
for consideration purposes and that part of 
it, that is, the money that has been earned 
from the inheritance in part through the 
management of the defendant be considered as 
a marital asset. (R. 204, Conclusions.) 
For some inexplicable reason, and in spite of these Findings 
and Conclusions, Mr. Motes now argues that he received nothing 
from the trial court for the efforts he claimed he expended in 
investing and managing Mrs. Motes's inheritance. Consequently, 
he argues that he's now entitled to share in the appreciation of 
all the inherited money, regardless of whether its Mrs. Motesfs 
or the children's. 
In fact, those efforts and any appreciation was specifically 
considered by the Court by its award to Mr. Motes of $12,2 06.00 
more in marital property than it awarded to Mrs. Motes with a 
very clear explanation as to why the Court was doing what it did. 
Given the Findings and Conclusions set out above and the 
specific allocation of marital property which gave Mr. Motes 
$12,206.00 more than Mrs. Motes, how can he now in good faith 
argue that 
. . . the trial court erred in refusing to 
consider the appreciation in the plaintiff's 
inheritance as an asset which should be 
considered in dividing property between the 
parties. 
p. 21, Respondent's Brief. 
The answer to that question is possibly found on page 2 3 of 
the Respondent's Brief, when he states 
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In this case the defendant [Mr. Motes] 
decided to ask the court to rule on the 
division of the appreciation in the 
inheritance only after the plaintiff had 
already appealed the case to this court. Id. 
The decision of the trial court in the inheritance and 
related appreciation issue is correct and falls squarely within 
the broad discretion of the trial court to fashion remedies which 
can best fairly fit the facts of the case before it. Here the 
Court returned to Mrs. Motes her inheritance and any appreciation 
related to what she retained, gave Mr. Motes a $12,000.00 credit, 
awarded alimony of $1.00 per year to each and awarded minimal 
child support — all of which is consistent with the holding, 
approach and concepts set forth in Mortensen, supra. 
Mr. Motes's cross appeal on this issue is without merit and 
should be denied. Further, when the statement appearing on page 
23 of his brief is considered in light of the record and the 
clear findings of the trial court, Mrs. Motesfs request for 
attorneys1 fees and costs related to this appeal and cross appeal 
should be granted. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court abused its discretion in the manner it dealt 
with Mr. Motes's military retirement benefits and, consequently, 
gave to Mr. Motes, over a five-year period, approximately 
$89,000.00 more than Mrs. Motes will receive from that asset. 
That portion of Judge Rigtrup's decision should be reversed and 
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remanded with instructions to divide the pension plans of the 
parties using an appropriate formula for division, such as the 
one suggested in Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982), 
and reimburse Mrs. Motes for her share of the monthly retirement 
benefits received by Mr. Motes since July 30, 1987, 
The recent decision of Martinez v. Martinez, supra, requires 
that Judge Rigtrup's award of the income tax exemption for one of 
the minor children to Mr. Motes be reversed on the grounds that 
federal law in effect at the time of trial requires that the 
custodial parent receive the exemptions unless certain exceptions 
can be shown, none of which are present in this case. Mrs. Motes 
is entitled to claim all three children as exemptions, commencing 
with the 1987 tax year. 
The cross appeal of Mr. Motes on the issue of appreciation 
related to Mrs. Motes's inheritance is without merit. The 
findings clearly show that the trial court did consider 
appreciation related to that inheritance by awarding Mr. Motes 
$12,000.00 more in marital assets than Mrs. Motes in order to 
compensate him for the services he claimed he rendered in 
connection with that appreciation. That portion of Judge 
Rigtrup's decision should be affirmed. 
Finally, an award of attorneys1 fees and costs on appeal to 
Mrs. Motes is appropriate for two reasons. First, because the 
trial court incorrectly adopted an "income stream" theory urged 
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by Mr. Motes in relation to the military retirement when it 
should have been treated as property and divided at the time. 
Mrs. Motes had no other option than to appeal. She should not be 
required to bear those costs. Second, Mr. Motesfs cross appeal 
is without merit and evidently was filed only because Mrs. Motes 
appealed the retirement issue. (See p. 23 of Mr. Motes!s brief.) 
The costs of addressing that issue should not be borne by Mrs. 
Motes nor should Mr. Motes's cavalier approach to that issue be 
sanctioned by this Court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 24th day of October, 1988. 
DART, ADAMSO»'& KASTING 
KENT M. KASTIMfSr—1 
Attorneys for Mrs. Motes, Pla^ 
Appellant 
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